Is India’s Federal Structure Under Stress? Need for Institutional Reset Explained

Context

The discussion on the nature and future of Indian federalism has gained fresh momentum with the submission of Part I of the Justice Kurian Joseph Committee’s report. Constituted by the Tamil Nadu government, the report calls for a fundamental rebalancing of Centre–State relations, emphasising the need to strengthen State autonomy while recalibrating the Union’s role to its core constitutional functions.

About Indian federalism

• Indian federalism serves as an institutional framework accommodating two distinct sets of polities: regional and national. Each tier of government enjoys autonomy within its designated sphere.
• The Indian Constitution establishes a federation with a strong central authority, though scholars like C. Wheare have characterized it as “quasi-federal,” emphasizing unitary characteristics with subsidiary federal features.

Key features of federalism in the Constitution

Features of Indian Federalism

• Dual Polity: It establishes a dual structure comprising the Union at the Centre and autonomous States, each with defined spheres of sovereignty.
• Written Constitution: The Constitution is codified, outlining clear powers and responsibilities.
• Division of Powers:Powers are categorized into Union, State, and Concurrent lists, ensuring clear demarcation.
• Constitutional Supremacy: The Constitution is the supreme law, ensuring all legislation conforms to its provisions.
• Rigidity: Federal provisions are amendable through a stringent process requiring joint action by the Centre and States.
• Independent Judiciary: Headed by the Supreme Court, it adjudicates disputes and upholds constitutional supremacy.
• Bicameralism: The Parliament consists of an Upper House (Rajya Sabha) representing States and a Lower House (Lok Sabha) representing the people.

Constituent Assembly’s Federal Vision

Challenges in the Indian Federal Structure

• Centralization vs. Regionalism: Balancing national unity with regional autonomy is a delicate task. Strong central control risks alienating regional sentiments
  • Eg. protests against Hindi imposition in South India and the unilateral abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir.
• Regional Discontent :Demands for autonomy based on language and culture, such as the Bodoland and Gorkhaland movements, pose internal security challenges and strain federal cohesion.
• Disputes over Division of Powers: Ambiguities in power division between the Centre and states lead to conflicts, exemplified by disputes over agriculture laws and the interpretation of concurrent list subjects.
• Misuse of Governor’s Office: Concerns arise from instances of arbitrary dismissal of state governments, manipulation in government formation, and interference in legislative processes by Governors aligned with the central ruling party.
• Misuse of Article 356:Article 356, allowing for President’s Rule, has historically been invoked under questionable circumstances, impacting state autonomy and political stability.
• Fiscal Imbalances: Unequal revenue distribution and delayed GST compensation create financial stress for states, exacerbating disparities between tax-contributing and tax-receiving states.
• Asymmetric Representation in Parliament: Larger states dominate national politics due to population-based representation in the Lok Sabha, marginalizing smaller states.

Solutions for a Structural Reset of Indian Federalism

• Right-sizing the Union Government: The Union should focus on core national responsibilities such as defence, foreign affairs, currency, macroeconomic stability, and inter-State coordination.
  • Excessive involvement in subjects like health, education, and local welfare dilutes efficiency and stretches administrative capacity.
• Restoring Genuine State Autonomy: States must be allowed full legislative and executive freedom within their constitutional domains, especially in State List and Concurrent List subjects.
  • This restores accountability, as citizens can directly evaluate State governments for policy success or failure.
• Rebalancing the Concurrent List: The Union’s practice of overriding State laws through expansive legislation and subordinate rules must be restrained.
  • Concurrent List subjects should reflect cooperative decision-making, not unilateral central dominance.
• Reducing Micromanagement via Centrally Sponsored Schemes: Centrally Sponsored Schemes with rigid design templates should be replaced with block grants and flexible funding.
  • States should have discretion to adapt programmes to local socio-economic, cultural, and ecological contexts.
• Reforming Fiscal Federalism: Finance Commission transfers should move away from conditionality-heavy frameworks that distort State priorities
  • Greater predictability and autonomy in fiscal transfers strengthen State planning and long-term governance capacity.
• Strengthening Cooperative, Not Command Federalism: The Union and States must function as constitutional partners, not rivals in a zero-sum power contest.
  • Institutional dialogue, not executive fiat, should guide Centre-State relations.
• Encouraging Policy Experimentation by States: Decentralisation enables States to act as laboratories of democracy, experimenting with policies at manageable scale.
  • Successful State innovations can later be scaled nationally, reducing policy risk and improving outcomes.
• Reasserting Federalism as a Constitutional Principle: Federalism must be treated as a Basic Structure principle, not an administrative convenience.
  • Judicial, legislative, and executive actions should respect the idea that States are supreme within their allotted spheres.
• Reforming the Role of Governors: Governors should act as constitutional bridges, not political agents of the Union.
  • Misuse of discretionary powers undermines democratic mandates and federal trust.

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