Romeo and Juliet Clause in Indian Criminal Law

Criminal law wields its greatest influence and poses the most significant risks when it intrudes upon personal relationships. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), established to safeguard children from sexual exploitation, abuse, and trafficking, has progressively been used to criminalise consensual adolescent relationships. This incident reveals a profound constitutional and ethical paradox: a child-protection law that penalises youths for typical manifestations of adolescent intimacy. The increasing judicial unease regarding this outcome has culminated in the Supreme Court’s remarks in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh and Another (2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29), which explicitly recognised the systemic abuse of POCSO and urged legislative re-evaluation through the implementation of a Romeo and Juliet clause.

A Romeo and Juliet clause is a specifically defined legal exemption that decriminalises consenting sexual or romantic interactions between adolescents who are of similar ages. It does not undermine the law’s safeguards against exploitation, coercion, or abuse; instead, it guarantees that criminal penalties target harm rather than adolescent development. This essay analyses the constitutional inconsistencies inherent in POCSO, the judicial cautions on its misuse, the international perspective on close-in-age exemptions, and the pressing necessity for legislative reform in India.

Understanding the Romeo and Juliet Clause

A Romeo and Juliet clause acknowledges the legal and social differentiation between sexual predation and age-appropriate adolescent intimacy. Such rules exempt consensual partnerships between juveniles or between a minor and a young adult, contingent upon the age difference adhering to a specified limit and the relationship being devoid of force, authority, or exploitation.

The legislative purpose of such clauses is not to validate sexual exploitation, but to avert the criminal justice system from encroaching on consensual interactions that constitute a typical aspect of adolescent development. These clauses are founded on the ideas of proportionality, autonomy, and harm-based regulation, which closely correspond with constitutional safeguards of liberty and dignity.

Legislative Purpose and the Misrepresentation of POCSO

The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 was established to combat the widespread issue of child sexual abuse, especially in situations characterised by power disparities, trust, and vulnerability. The statute operates under the premise that any sexual conduct with an individual under eighteen years of age is intrinsically exploitative, hence rendering consent legally inconsequential.

This absolutist approach, aimed at providing utmost safety, has resulted in troubling results when applied to consensual adolescent relationships. Criminal proceedings are often instigated not due to actual injury to a kid, but rather because parents object to a relationship influenced by caste, religion, social standing, or moral values. A familial dispute escalates into a significant criminal prosecution, subjecting youth to arrest, imprisonment, stigma, and enduring legal trauma.

The utilisation of the State’s coercive power to address parental anxiety instead of genuine harm fundamentally distorts the protective intent of POCSO. At that juncture, criminal law transitions from protection to regulation.

The Constitutional Dilemma of POCSO

The child protection framework in India currently encounters a constitutional contradiction. A law intended to protect children is increasingly employed to penalise adolescents for consensual relationships. The statute equates consensual relationships among minors with serious sexual offences, obliterating significant distinctions and fails to meet the constitutional criterion of proportionality.

Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits manifest arbitrariness. Equating a consensual relationship between a seventeen-year-old and an eighteen-year-old with sexual assault overlooks significant distinctions and yields illogical consequences. Article 21, safeguarding personal liberty, dignity, and decisional autonomy, is infringed upon when teenagers endure extended pre-trial detention for actions that inflict little evident harm.

The selective suspension of adolescent consent under POCSO disregards actual experiences. Adolescence is commonly acknowledged as a phase of emotional, romantic, and sexual exploration. Criminalising such behaviour does not safeguard adolescents; it traumatises them and diminishes their autonomy.

Judicial Cautions Regarding the Misapplication of POCSO

Indian High Courts have consistently warned against the abuse of POCSO to penalise consenting adolescent relationships. In Sabari v. Inspector of Police (2019), the Madras High Court noted that the POCSO Act was being utilised to penalise juvenile romantic relationships, leading to dire repercussions for young individuals. The Court cautioned that the Act was never designed to function as an instrument of moral enforcement.

In Vijayalakshmi v. State (2021 SCC OnLine Mad 317), the Madras High Court emphasised that the inflexible enforcement of POCSO in consenting circumstances was resulting in injustice and called upon the government to reevaluate the statutory framework. The Delhi High Court in Ajay Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2022 SCC OnLine Del 3705) similarly underscored that the purpose of POCSO is to save minors from exploitation, rather than to criminalise consensual love relationships among young people.

These court findings indicate a persistent acknowledgement that the Act, in its present formulation, neglects the realities of adolescence.

Supreme Court’s Involvement in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh (2026)

The Supreme Court’s decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh and Another is a crucial development in this advancing jurisprudence. A Bench consisting of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh acknowledged the persistent misuse of POCSO in matters pertaining to consenting adolescent relationships.

The Court, while overturning the Allahabad High Court’s directive requiring medical age assessment in all POCSO bail cases, recognised that genuine adolescent relationships were being inappropriately subjected to the criminal justice system due to the inflexibility of the statute. The Court emphasised the lack of a statutory framework to differentiate between exploitative behaviour and consensual relationships between individuals of similar ages, and explicitly recommended that the Union Government contemplate the implementation of a Romeo and Juliet clause.

This observation should be interpreted as a constitutional warning. Judicial bodies cannot perpetually mitigate legislative inflexibility by individual remedies while young lives suffer irreversible harm.

Comparative Statutory Practice: Global Perspectives

A Romeo and Juliet provision is neither innovative nor untested. It is a well-recognised legislative instrument across several jurisdictions.

Numerous states in the United States acknowledge close-in-age exemptions. Section 22.011 of the Texas Penal Code provides an exception for consensual sexual conduct when the accused is no more than three years older than the minor, the minor is at least fourteen years of age, and the relationship is non-exploitative. In State v. Limon (122 P.3d 22, Kan. 2005), the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the imposition of disproportionate fines on consenting adolescent relationships contravened constitutional principles of equality.

Canada implements a tiered consent system under Section 150.1 of the Criminal Code, allowing consensual sexual interactions between adolescents of similar ages, while distinctly prohibiting exploitative relationships characterised by authority or dependency. The Supreme Court of Canada in R v. G.F. (2021 SCC 20)emphasised the significance of competence and autonomy in evaluating consent.

Germany adopts a harm-based framework as delineated in Section 182 of the German Penal Code, penalising solely those actions that take advantage of a minor’s deficiency in sexual self-determination. Australian jurisdictions similarly implement close-in-age defences while maintaining stringent restrictions against abuse and coercion.

In this context, India’s absolutist framework under POCSO is an anomaly rather than a standard.

Incorporating a Romeo and Juliet Clause into Indian Law

A precisely defined Romeo and Juliet clause can be integrated into Indian law without compromising kid safety. This rule could exempt consensual relationships in which the younger individual is at least sixteen years old, the age disparity does not surpass three years, and the relationship is devoid of force, authority, or exploitation.

The exclusion must unequivocally exclude relationships characterised by trust, supervision, dominance, trafficking, pornography, or serious sexual offences. Appropriate controls will guarantee that POCSO effectively addresses genuine harm while preventing misuse against minors.

Constitutional and Societal Ramifications

Criminalising consensual adolescence contradicts the constitutional principles of dignity, liberty, and equality. It transmutes process into retribution and changes a protective statute into a mechanism of social regulation. The Supreme Court’s remarks in 2026 emphasise that legislative inaction is now detrimental rather than neutral.

Child safety does not necessitate the criminalisation of adolescent intimacy. A Romeo and Juliet clause would reestablish proportionality, safeguard fundamental rights, and uphold the validity of POCSO. It would regard teenagers as individuals possessing rights, rather than solely as subjects of safeguarding.

Conclusion

A child-protection law that penalises consenting adolescent behaviour transitions from safeguarding to exercising control. The implementation of a specifically designed Romeo and Juliet clause, guided by constitutional principles and comparative statute practices, has transitioned from a policy choice to a constitutional need. Parliament must take action. Delay is detrimental. It harms youthful lives, undermines confidence in the criminal justice system, and perverts the fundamental objective of child protection.

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