Ambiguities in India’s Nuclear Liability Law: Implications and International Relevance

India’s ambition to expand its civil nuclear energy capacity is a critical pillar of its long-term energy security and climate commitments. However, this ambition has consistently faced roadblocks due to legal complexities surrounding nuclear liability, particularly under the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010.

While the Act was enacted to protect victims and ensure accountability, ambiguities related to supplier liability have discouraged foreign investment, stalled major nuclear projects, and raised concerns about India’s compliance with international nuclear liability norms.

This article examines the legal framework, contentious provisions, constitutional dimensions, international implications, and the policy debate surrounding India’s nuclear liability regime.

Legal Framework of Civil Nuclear Liability in India

A combination of domestic legislation and international commitments governs India’s nuclear liability regime:

Key Instruments

• Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010

• Atomic Energy Act, 1962

• Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), 1997 (ratified by India in 2016)

The CLNDA was enacted to establish a structured mechanism for compensation in the event of a nuclear incident. It draws inspiration from global nuclear liability principles enshrined in the Vienna Convention, Paris Convention, and Brussels Supplementary Convention, while adapting them to India’s constitutional and environmental framework.

Objectives and Key Features of the CLNDA, 2010

The Act seeks to balance victim protection with operational accountability and international cooperation.

Salient Features

• Strict and No-Fault Liability
  The nuclear operator bears liability irrespective of negligence or intent.

• Operator-Centric Liability
  The primary responsibility for nuclear damage lies with the operator (typically NPCIL).

• Liability Cap

  • Operator liability capped at ₹1,500 crore

  • Government liability capped at 300 million SDRs (≈ ₹2,100–2,300 crore)

• Insurance Requirement
  Operators must maintain insurance or financial security.

• Timelines and Reporting
  The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board must report incidents within 15 days.

• Nuclear Damage Claims Commission
  Established for adjudication and fair compensation.

Ambiguities in Supplier Liability Provisions

Section 17(b): Right of Recourse Against Suppliers

Section 17(b) permits the operator to seek recourse from suppliers if nuclear damage results from:

• Patent or latent defects in equipment or material

• Substandard services provided by suppliers or their employees

Why Is Section 17(b) Controversial?

• It exceeds CSC norms, which allow supplier liability only when:

  • Explicitly provided in a contract (Section 17(a)), or

  • Damage is caused intentionally (Section 17(c))

• It introduces liability for unintentional defects, which is uncommon in global nuclear practice

• This uncertainty has discouraged foreign suppliers, particularly from the US, France, and Japan

Section 46: Supplementary Civil and Criminal Liability

Section 46 states that the CLNDA does not bar victims from seeking remedies under other laws.

Implications

• Opens the door to tort-based civil suits and criminal prosecution

• Creates indeterminate and potentially unlimited liability

• Absence of clarity on the scope of “nuclear damage” amplifies legal risk

• When combined with Section 17(b), it creates dual exposure for suppliers—contrary to CSC principles

Impact on Civil Nuclear Agreements and Projects

Liability concerns have directly affected India’s nuclear partnerships:

Stalled or Uncertain Projects

• Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project (France – EDF)
  Negotiations ongoing since 2009, despite revised MoUs in 2016 and 2018

• Kovvada Nuclear Power Project (USA)
  Progress stalled due to liability apprehensions

• Kudankulam Nuclear Plant (Russia)
  Only major foreign collaboration to progress—initiated before CLNDA enactment

India’s target of expanding nuclear energy capacity depends heavily on resolving these liability-related uncertainties.

Constitutional and Environmental Law Dimensions

Article 21: Right to Life

The Supreme Court has consistently held that:

• The right to life includes the right to a clean and safe environment

• Compensation, rehabilitation, and environmental remediation after nuclear accidents fall within Article 21’s scope

Environmental Principles

• Precautionary Principle

• Polluter Pays Principle
  (Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, 1996)

While CLNDA aligns with these principles by holding operators liable, vague extensions of liability to suppliers without procedural safeguards raise due process concerns and threaten business sustainability.

India’s Position in the International Nuclear Regime

The Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) aims to:

• Channel liability exclusively to operators

• Ensure uniformity in nuclear liability laws

• Guarantee prompt and adequate compensation to victims

India’s Deviation from CSC Norms

• Sections 17(b) and 46 dilute the principle of exclusive operator liability

• Discourages participation from CSC member states

• Undermines India’s credibility as a predictable nuclear partner

• Limits prospects for future bilateral and multilateral nuclear cooperation

Although countries like the US and France rely on clear legislative safeguards and robust insurance frameworks, uncertainty in India’s liability regime continues to impede progress.

Policy Debate and the Way Forward

The government argues that Section 17(b) is permissive, not mandatory, but statutory language suggests otherwise—leaving interpretation to courts.

Key Recommendations by Legal Experts

• Amend Section 17(b) to restrict supplier liability strictly to CSC-compliant conditions

• Clarify Section 46 through statutory rules or official notifications limiting parallel civil claims

• Define “nuclear damage” clearly under Section 3(e)

• Establish a specialised nuclear liability tribunal to prevent litigation overload

• Create a government-backed supplier insurance pool to distribute risk and build confidence

Conclusion

India’s civil nuclear liability framework represents a delicate balance between victim protection, environmental responsibility, and economic development. However, uncertainties surrounding supplier liability under the CLNDA—particularly Sections 17(b) and 46—have emerged as major obstacles to the country’s nuclear ambitions.

For India to evolve into a reliable and attractive civil nuclear power, it must:

• Align its liability regime with international standards

• Provide legal certainty to suppliers

• Strengthen institutional mechanisms for compensation and adjudication

A reformed, predictable, and globally harmonised nuclear liability framework is essential for energy security, climate goals, and international trust.

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