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A Red Sunset on the Horizon- Decline of Maoist Insurgency in India

Context

The Maoist movement, which began with the 1967 Naxalbari uprising and once spanned India’s heartland as its “biggest internal security threat,” is now at a critical turning point, with sustained counter-insurgency and development efforts shrinking the “Red Corridor” into small remaining pockets.

Current Status of Maoist Insurgency

 

  • Geographic contraction:
    • In the late 2000s, Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) affected ~180 districts across 92,000 square kilometres.
    • As of April 2024, this has been reduced to 38 districts, with only 6 districts of concern (e.g., parts of Bastar in Chhattisgarh, some areas in Jharkhand, Odisha, and the Chhattisgarh–Telangana border).
  • Operational weakening:
    • In 2025 alone: 270 Maoists were killed, 680 were arrested, and 1,225 surrendered (MHA data).
    • Large weapons caches seized; guerrilla cadres face shortages of arms and logistics.
    • Leadership decapitated: multiple Central Committee members and senior commanders killed.
  • Recruitment collapse:
    • No recruitment from non-tribal areas for over a decade.
    • Even tribal youth, once the backbone, now prefer education, jobs, and mobile connectivity over austere guerrilla life.

From Red Corridor to Red Pockets

 

Red Corridor (Peak in 2000s):

  • In the late 2000s, Left Wing Extremism (LWE) spanned a contiguous stretch of ~180 districts across 10 states, from the Nepal border through Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, parts of Maharashtra and West Bengal.
  • This vast swathe was called the “Red Corridor”, where Maoists ran parallel administrations, levied taxes, recruited cadres, and carried out large-scale attacks.
  • Their stronghold was the Dandakaranya forests (Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Maharashtra, Andhra-Telangana border).

Red Pockets (Current Situation)

  • Today, LWE has contracted to about 38 districts (2024 MHA data), with only 6 “districts of concern”.
  • Maoists are now confined to small, isolated forest belts:
    • Bastar (Chhattisgarh),
    • Dandakaranya region,
    • parts of Jharkhand, Odisha, and the Chhattisgarh–Telangana border.
  • The once-contiguous corridor has fragmented into isolated red pockets with little interconnectivity or public support.

Reasons for the Current Decline of Naxalism

  • Sustained Security Pressure:
    • Targeted counter-insurgency operations: Central Armed Police Forces (CRPF, CoBRA units), and state-level elite forces (e.g., Greyhounds in Andhra–Telangana, C-60 in Maharashtra, DRG in Chhattisgarh) have inflicted heavy losses on Maoists.
    • Decapitation of leadership: In recent years, many top CPI (Maoist) leaders, including Politburo and Central Committee members, have been killed. With ageing leaders and no effective second-line replacements, the organisational structure has weakened.
    • Advanced technology: Use of drones, satellite imagery, electronic surveillance, and improved intelligence networks has limited Maoists’ ability to move or regroup.
  • Decline in Recruitment & Popular Base:
    • Loss of tribal support: Once the backbone of the movement, tribal youth now prefer education, government jobs, and modern lifestyles over jungle life.
    • Improved access to state benefits: Roads, schools, mobile networks, PDS, scholarships, and healthcare have reduced Maoists’ appeal.
    • Social aspiration shift: With Internet and mobile penetration, young people aspire to mainstream opportunities instead of austere guerrilla existence.
  • Developmental Interventions by Government:
    • Special Central Assistance (SCA) Scheme funds roads, bridges, telecom, and welfare projects in LWE districts.
    • Aspirational Districts Programme improved service delivery in health, education, and skill development.
    • Focused tribal development: FRA (Forest Rights Act), PESA, scholarships, and health programmes in Maoist areas reduced grievances.
    • Visible state presence: Earlier, Maoists ran “parallel governments” in remote forests; now, governance and welfare outreach have displaced that legitimacy.
  • Effective State-Level Strategies:
    • Andhra Pradesh & Telangana: Greyhounds’ surgical strikes and rehabilitation programmes nearly wiped out Maoists in the region.
    • Maharashtra (Gadchiroli): C-60 commando force and civic action projects have weakened Maoist bases.
    • Chhattisgarh: District Reserve Guards (DRG), composed of surrendered Maoists and tribal youth, have been effective in Bastar.
    • Jharkhand & Odisha: Special surrender policies, focus on schools and welfare outreach in remote villages, and better intelligence have reduced Maoist activities.
  • Surrender and Rehabilitation Policies:
    • Governments offer cash incentives, housing, jobs, and education to surrendered Maoists.
    • Many senior leaders and their families have surrendered, disillusioned by harsh jungle life and health issues.
    • This has created a psychological impact: desertions and weakening of Maoist morale.
  • Organisational Fatigue & Ideological Decline:
    • The Maoist leadership is ageing and unhealthy; new recruits are scarce.
    • Factionalism: Some leaders (like Mallojula Venugopal Rao) openly call for ending armed struggle, while hardliners resist.
    • Ideological irrelevance: Maoist rhetoric of class war is failing to resonate with new generations, especially in areas benefiting from development.
  • Loss of Safe Sanctuaries & Inter-State Cooperation:
    • Earlier, Maoists thrived by moving across porous state borders. Now, better interstate coordination has reduced safe zones.
    • Increased road and telecom connectivity has made it difficult for them to operate in secrecy.

Government Interventions

Central Government Measures

  • Security Operations:
    • Deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) with elite units (CoBRA commandos, Greyhounds).
    • Creation of Unified Command in affected states for coordination.
    • Use of UAVs, drones, and AI for surveillance.
  • Developmental Initiatives:
    • Aspirational Districts Programme targeting LWE-affected areas.
    • Special Central Assistance (SCA) Scheme for LWE districts to fund infrastructure, schools, health, skill development.
    • Focus on roads (RAPID programme), telecom, banking inclusion, and welfare schemes like PDS, health insurance.
  • Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy:
    • Monetary incentives, housing, skill training, and livelihood support for surrendered cadres.

State-level Interventions

  • Chhattisgarh:
    • Greyhounds-inspired DRG (District Reserve Guards) using surrendered Maoists as local fighters.
    • Bastar-specific civic action programmes, skill training for youth.
  • Telangana & Andhra Pradesh:
    • Greyhounds as a specialised counter-insurgency force.
    • Successful combination of policing + political negotiations (2000s onwards).
  • Jharkhand:
    • Jharkhand Jaguar anti-Naxal unit.
    • Village defence committees, welfare outreach.
  • Odisha: Surrender policies, infrastructure push, focus on tribal education and welfare in Koraput–Malkangiri.
  • Maharashtra (Gadchiroli): C-60 commando force, effective local policing, and strong civic engagement.

Is This the End of Naxalism?

 

  • Reasons for optimism:
    • Severe leadership losses and desertions.
    • Collapse of the recruitment base.
    • Stronger state presence in core tribal areas.
    • The growing irrelevance of ideology in changing socio-economic settings.
  • Reasons for caution:
    • Maoist ideology may not vanish; remnants could survive underground.
    • Past peace talks (e.g., Andhra Pradesh 2004) collapsed, leading to resurgence.
    • Underlying grievances – land alienation, tribal displacement, exploitation — remain unresolved.
    • Maoists may regroup in new forms (urban networks, issue-based fronts, or alliances with other extremist groups).

Way Forward and Recommendations

  • Sustained Security Pressure: Maintain area domination and prevent regrouping; focus on precision operations with minimal collateral damage.
  • Inclusive Development: Accelerate welfare delivery – land rights, forest rights, healthcare, schools, jobs – in tribal belts.
  • Strengthen Local Governance: Empower Gram Sabhas, strengthen PESA and FRA implementation, ensure local participation in development.
  • Credible Rehabilitation: Transparent surrender packages, long-term livelihood opportunities, and social reintegration.
  • Civil-Military Fusion: Combine modern surveillance, drones, and AI with local intelligence networks (surrendered cadres, villagers).
  • Address Structural Grievances: Prevent displacement due to mining/industrial projects without fair compensation and consent.
  • Dialogue Preparedness: Be open to credible peace talks if insurgents demonstrate sincerity; ensure verification mechanisms.
  • Prevent Ideological Revival: Counter Maoist propaganda through education, digital access, youth engagement, and community leadership.

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